Otsuka Electronics USA, INC. v. Imaging Specialists, INC., Mark H. Levy, John R. Merendino, Richard M. Taylor : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Otsuka Electronics USA, INC. v. Imaging
Specialists, INC., Mark H. Levy, John R.
Merendino, Richard M. Taylor : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Anderson & Smith; Robert M. Anderson; Wesley F. Sine; Paul Levy, Esq., Counsel for Appellant.
Parsons Behle & Latimer; Gary Doctorman; Marji Hanson; COunsel for Appellee Otsuka.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Otsuka Electronics USA, INC. v. Imaging Specialists, INC., Mark H. Levy, John R. Merendino, Richard M. Taylor, No.
960337 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/269




UTAH COTTPT (W APPEALS ' ' U 
c?e, 
r""?"vA ELECTRONICS t 
FiainLiiis and A; 
vs. 
IMAGING SPECIALISTS, INC., a 
Utah corporation; MARK H. 
LEVY, JOHN R. MERENDINO, 
RICHARD M. TAYLOR, 






Vlti^r, / .A 
1 5 
1:1 R IE J' OF APPELLANTS 
[ x i r j J u J i c J !>.<^4f aci-f- QM, t " r ----- /AJ i 1 . •v /; 
ANDERSON & SMITH, L.C. 
Robert M. Anderson (#01uo, 
136 South Main Street; Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801) 535-llC^ 
Attorneys for Appellan .. Hark H. 
Levy, r * ;. endino and Richard 
M- Ta/1 ox-
Wesley F. Sine (296^ 
36 South State Street __„.- r 
Salt Lake City, "UT 84111 
Telephone (S:i; 3 64-5125 
Attorney for Appellant" ""waging 
Specialists, Inc. 
Pail! 1 ^rr 
5 4 i i Avenue, #1015 
Chevy Chase, Maryland 2 0815 
Telephone ("' ' 951-0477 
Of Counsel x.wi Appellant Mark H. 
Levy 
PARSONS BEHLE h LATIMER 
Gary E. Doctorman (08 95) 
Marji Hanson (5712) 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake C:- 34145-0898 
Telephone tsv "?34 
Attorneys for 
FILED 
SEP 25 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OTSUKA ELECTRONICS USA, INC., 
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l e e , 
v s . 
IMAGING SPECIALISTS, INC., a 
Utah corporation; MARK H. 
LEVY, JOHN R. MERENDINO, 
RICHARD M. TAYLOR, 
Defendants and Appellants 
No. 960337-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ANDERSON & SMITH, L.C. 
Robert M. Anderson (#0108) 
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801) 539-1100 
Attorneys for Appellants, Mark H. 
Levy# John R. Merendino and Richard 
M, Taylor 
Wesley F. Sine (2967) 
36 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-5125 
Attorney for Appellant Imaging 
Specialists, Inc. 
Paul Levy, Esq. 
5454 Wisconsin Avenue, #1015 
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20815 
Telephone (301) 951-0477 
Of Counsel for Appellant Mark H. 
Levy 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Gary E. Doctorman (08 95) 
Marji Hanson (5712) 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone (801) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Appellee 
PARTIES 
1. Appellee Otsuka is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business located in Fort Collins, Colorado. 
2. Appellant Imaging Specialists, Inc., is a Utah corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and is the corporate general partner of Wasatch Imaging, Ltd. 
3. Appellant Mark H. Levy is an individual and resident of 
Lewes, Delaware, and is a principal of Imaging Specialists. 
4. Appellant Dr. John Merendino is an individual and 
resident of Sandy, Utah, and is a former principal of Imaging 
Specialists. 
5. Appellant Richard Taylor is an individual and resident of 
Naples, Florida and is a principal of Imaging Specialists. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
I. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
A. Standard of Review 1 
B. Preservation of Issue 1 
II. DOES A FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT PRECLUDE LITIGATION ON ALL 
DEFENSES AND CLAIMS IN A CONTRACT CASE, INCLUDING CLAIMS 
THAT THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT AND THE FORBEARANCE ITSELF 
WERE FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED? IS SUCH AN ISSUE SUITABLE FOR 
SUMMARY ADJUDICATION? 2 
A. Standard of Review 2 
B. Preservation of Issue 2 
III. IS IT PROPER TO DENY A PARTY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
AN ANSWER AND ADD A COUNTERCLAIM FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF 
• THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING, WHERE THAT PARTY 
HAS PRESENTED NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN? 3 
A. Standard of Review 3 
B. Preservation of Issue 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF, BECAUSE APPELLANTS DISCOVERED AND PRESENTED TO 
THE COURT EVIDENCE OF FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 15 
A. INTRODUCTION 15 
B. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASES 17 
C. APPELLANTS PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF 
OTSUKA'S FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 18 
ii 
THE FORBEARANCE IS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED BY 
FRAUD AND IS AN ATTEMPT BY OTSUKA TO ABSOLVE ITSELF OF 
LIABILITY FOR FRAUD 24 
A. INTRODUCTION 24 
B. FORBEARANCE AGREEMENTS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD 
ARE VOID 25 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ALLOW APPELLANTS TO 
AMEND THEIR ANSWER AND ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM 
AGAINST OTSUKA 34 
A. INTRODUCTION 34 
B. APPELLANTS' PROPOSED AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS TIMELY FILED AND IS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO OTSUKA 34 
C. APPELLANTS' PROPOSED AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM PROPERLY ALLEGE CLAIMS FOR FRAUD 
AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING 3 6 
1. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND 
OMISSION 36 
2. BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING 3 7 
CONCLUSION 3 9 
ADDENDUM 43 
A. Exhibit 5 from Ariatti Deposition (Memorandum 
from Henderson to Ariatti and Grant, dated 
February 4, 1993). 
B. Transcript of hearing November 13, 1995 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW 
Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041 
(Utah App. 1991) 3, 34 
Anheuser-Busch v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W. 2d. 928 
(App Tx. 1993) 31 
Allied Paper, Inc. v. H.M. Holdings, Inc.. 619 N.E. 2d 
1121 (1993) 32 
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 
(Utah 1985) 21 
Berkelv Bank for Cooperative v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1980) 20 
Cerritos Trucking Co.v. Utah Venture No. 1.. 645 P.2d 
600 (Utah 1982) 17, 20 
Clements Auto Co.v. Service Bureau Corp., 9 U.C.C. Rptr. 
Serv. 189, 444 F.2d 169 (1971) 30 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 
(App.Utah 1987) 17, 21 
Flvnn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. Co.. 509 P.2d 356 
(Utah 1973) 17 
Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co. , 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984) . . 17 
Galloway v. Afco Dev. Corp., 777 P. 2d 506 (Utah App. 
1989) * 20 
Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1993) 1 
Horaan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1982) 28 
Kalish- Jarcho v. Citv of New York, 58 N.Y. 2d 192 
(N.Y.Ct. 1941) 31 
Lamb v. Bangart. 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) . . . 2, 26, 27, 28 
Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 
(Utah App 1991) 22, 23 
iv 
Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981) 3, 35 
Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 1954) 40 
Mountain American Credit Union v. McClellan. 854 P.2d 
590 (Utah App. 1993) 3, 34 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1993) 26 
Ona International (U.S.A.) v. 11th Avenue Corp., 
850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993) 2, 26, 28, 36 
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) 36 
Rainford v. Rvttina 451 P.2d 769 (Utah 1969) 22 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guarantee 
Ins . Underwriters . Inc. . 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965) 2 
Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 833 P.2d 285 
(Utah App 1994) 17 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976) 17, 20 
Robberecht Seafood v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E. 2d 
682 (Va. 1979) 32, 33 
Herman Scwartz Inc. v. Citv of New York, 473 N.Y.S. 564 
(N.Y. App 1984) 30, 31 
St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 38 
TGB Inc. v. Bendis, 845 F. Supp 1459 (D. Kan 1994) . . . . 31 
Tulsa Citv Lines Inc. v. Mains, 107 F.2d 377 
(10th Cir. 1939) 30 
Union Bank v. Swenson , 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985) . 21, 22, 23 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) 20 
Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376 
(Utah App. 1993) 1, 18, 21 
Youna Felhaber Pile Co. v. State, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 192 
(N.Y.Ct. 1941) 32 
v 
STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 22 
TREATISES 
Prosser & Keeton, Torts, § 109 at 763 (5th ed. 1984) . . . 20 
vi 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Order and Judgment of Judge J. 
Dennis Frederick, Third Judicial District Cour~, of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
by Title II, Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. IS SUMMARY ADJUDICATION APPROPRIATE IN CONTRACT CASES WHERE 
THE DEFENDING PARTY HAS PLEADED FRAUD AND A BREACH OF THE DUTY 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AS TO A CONTRACT AND FOR-
BEARANCE, AND HAS, THROUGH DISCOVERY, PRODUCED EVIDENCE WHICH 
SUBSTANTIATES ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD AND BAD FAITH? 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment may be granted only in those matters 
where it is clear from the record that there exits no genuine issue 
as to any material fact. The trial court is to assume the facts 
asserted by the non-moving party to be true, and must conclude that 
the nonmoving party could not prevail as a matter of law. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56 (c) ; Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P. 2d. 224, 226 (Utah 
1983). No deference is to be accorded to the trial court's 
conclusions that the facts were not in dispute, nor to the court's 
legal conclusions based on those facts. Western Farm Credit Bank 
v. Pratt. 860 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Preservation of Issue 
This issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court in 
Defendants' Motion for Continuance Under Rule 56(f) or, In the 
Alternative, For An Extension of Time in Which to Respond to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, (R.000222, 000231); in 
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Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim 
(hereinafter, "Defendants' Motion for Leave") (R.000425); and in 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (hereinafter, "Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition") (R.000465) . 
II. DOES A FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT PRECLUDE LITIGATION ON ALL 
DEFENSES AND CLAIMS IN A CONTRACT CASE, INCLUDING CLAIMS THAT 
THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT AND THE FORBEARANCE ITSELF WERE 
FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED? IS SUCH AN ISSUE SUITABLE FOR SUMMARY 
ADJUDICATION? 
A. Standard of Review 
A release is voidable if it was procured by fraudulent 
activity, or if through such a release a party seeks to evade 
liability for fraud in the underlying contract. Ona International 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452-52 (Utah 
1993); Lamb v. Banaart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974). A factual 
issue as to whether a party obtained a release through fraud 
precludes summary judgment. Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity 
and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 398 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 
1965) . 
B. Preservation of Issue 
This issue was preserved for appeal in the court below in 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition (R.000465, 000487-490); and in 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Leave to Amend. (R.000850, 000852). 
2 
III. IS IT PROPER TO DENY A PARTY'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND AN 
ANSWER AND ADD A COUNTERCLAIM FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE DUTY 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING, WHERE THAT PARTY HAS PRESENTED 
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED 
THEREIN? 
A. Standard of Review 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) , leave to amend 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." Andalex 
Resources, Inc. v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1991). 
Relevant factors are the timeliness of the motion, the reason for 
the delay, and the resulting prejudice to the responding party. 
Mountain American Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 592 
(Utah App. 1993) . The primary consideration is whether the 
opposing party will have an adequate opportunity to address the 
newly-raised matters. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P. 2d 94, 98 (Utah 
1981) . 
B. Preservation of Issue 
This issue was preserved for appeal in the court below in 
Defendants7 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave (R.000456, 
000498-459) ; and Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Leave (R.000850-860) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Otsuka's Complaint in this case seeks judgment on the 
guaranties of payment executed by the Appellants in favor of 
Otsuka. (Complaint, R. 000001) . This is an appeal of two rulings by 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on November 13, 1995, and the Order and 
Judgment entered on March 8, 1996 pursuant to those rulings. 
Appellants appeal from the District Court's Order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Otsuka. (Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
Judgment, R.00 0050; Order of Judge Frederick, R.001059; Judgment 
R.001068). Appellants also appeal the District Court's denial of 
Appellants' motion for leave to file an amended answer and 
counterclaim against Otsuka alleging fraud and a breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. (Defendants' Motion for Leave, 
R. 000425; Order of Judge Frederick, R.001059) . 
Imaging Specialists is a Utah Corporation in the business of 
managing a facility which provides high-quality diagnostic magnetic 
imaging for health care providers through the use of magnetic 
resonance imaging equipment (MRI). Imaging Specialists is the 
corporate general partner of Wasatch Imaging, Ltd. ("Wasatch"). 
Defendants Levy, Merendino and Taylor are or were principals of 
Imaging Specialists. 
MRI equipment consists of advanced medical imaging apparatus 
which provides three-dimensional images of a section of the human 
anatomy with the use of magnets and computers as compared to 
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conventional x-rays. Due to the strength of the magnets used in 
MRI machines, each unit must be housed in a facility constructed in 
accordance with the technical specifications of the manufacturer. 
A company engaging in the manufacture and sale of MRIs must 
have a Section 510(K) application clearance from the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter, the nFDA") before it may 
sell an MRI commercially. (Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Continuance Under Rule 56(f), Exhibit A, R.000222, 
000237). Otsuka represented to Appellants and the general public 
in its August 1992 Newsletter that it had obtained such 510 (K) 
clearance to sell a previous model Otsuka MRI commercially. 
(Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Continuance Under 
Rule 56(f), Exhibit A, R.000222, 000237). 
In August, 1992, Otsuka initiated negotiations with Appellants 
for the lease of an Otsuka-manufactured MRI machine. (Proposed 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, attached as Exhibit A to 
Defendants' Motion For Leave (hereinafter, "Proposed Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim"), R.000425, 000439-40). Otsuka was informed that 
Wasatch Imaging and Appellants were interested in purchasing a 
high-quality state-of-the-art MRI to install in a facility to be 
constructed and operated by Wasatch Imaging near the Alta View 
Hospital in Salt Lake County, to serve the growing population in 
the area and the patient bases at that hospital and the adjacent 
clinics. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R.000440-41.) 
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Otsuka desired to enter into a transaction with Wasatch in 
order to develop a relationship with radiologists at the University 
of Utah Medical Center. Otsuka's ultimate goal was to obtain 
endorsement of the Otsuka MRI machine. (Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition, R.000474, and Deposition of John Ariatti attached 
thereto as Exhibit K, R.000644-645). 
On November 16, 1992, Otsuka presented to Imaging Specialists 
a quotation, number 921116-Q2JA, (hereafter referred to as 
"November 1992 Quotation"), for the acquisition of an "OE 1.5 SE 
Tesla Superconducting Magnet Assembly Device," and various other 
attachments and software (hereafter referred to as the "Otsuka 
MRI") . (November 1992 Quotation, attached as Exhibit A to 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000492). Otsuka assured 
Wasatch Imaging and Appellants that the MRI referred to in the 
November, 1992, Quotation would receive full 510(K) clearance and 
be available for installation by mid-January 1993. (Proposed 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R.000441; Letter from Dale Grant 
to Richard Taylor dated November 24,- 1992, attached as Exhibit H to 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000630). In reliance on 
Otsuka's representations that the Otsuka MRI would be delivered in 
January 1993, Imaging Specialists accepted the November 1992 
Quotation on November 18, 1992. (Proposed Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, R.000441). In fact, Otsuka did not receive full 
510(K) clearance until December of 1993. (Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Leave, R. 000688). 
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In mid-January 1993 the FDA began an unannounced audit of 
Otsuka's Fort Collins, Colorado facility. (Proposed Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim, R. 000443-444) . As a result of the FDA audit, the 
FDA issued an extensive letter citing Otsuka for 25 deviations from 
good manufacturing practices as defined by 21 C.F.R., Part 820 of 
the FDA regulations. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, 
R. 000443) . 
In addition, on or before February 1, 1993, the FDA apparently 
directed Otsuka to stop all MRI scanning activities involving 
humans. This is evidenced by correspondence from Otsuka sent to 
the only two medical clinics which had previously installed the 
Otsuka MRI directing those clinics to stop all scanning procedures 
on human patients. (Letters from Dale Grant to Robert Levitt, M.D. 
and Sam Mulopulos, M.D., dated February 1, 1993, attached as 
Exhibit M to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000654-655) . 
On February 5, 1993, Otsuka confirmed to the FDA that it had 
directed those two sites to immediately cease human scanning. 
(Letter from Otsuka's Jean Macheledt to FDA Officer Gary Dean dated 
February 5, 1993, attached as Exhibit N to Defendants' Memorandum 
in Opposition, R.000656). Otsuka did not disclose any of these 
communications or events to Wasatch or Appellants. (Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition, R.000478) . 
At some point in 1993, Otsuka decided not to market and sell 
the Otsuka MRI, and instructed its salespeople not to enter into 
transactions for the sale of the Otsuka MRI. (Deposition of John 
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Ariatti, attached as Exhibit K to Defendants7 Memorandum in 
Opposition, R.000642-43; Deposition of Dale Grant, attached as 
Exhibit J to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000634-35). 
Otsuka did not at any time inform Wasatch or Appellants of this 
decision. (Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000478-79) . 
On February 4, 1993, Otsuka consultant T. Michael Henderson 
prepared an internal memorandum to John Ariatti of Otsuka which 
stated: "If the creek don't rise (and the FDA doesn't cause them to 
choke) we should have another deal done next week." (Internal 
Memorandum from Mike Henderson to John Ariatti dated February 4, 
1993, referenced as Exhibit P to Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition, R.000478).1 
As predicted by Mr. Henderson, the next week, on February 11, 
1993, Otsuka delivered Master Lease Agreement No. 006 and related 
documents prepared by Otsuka to Wasatch and Appellants (herein-
after, the "February 1993 Lease"). (Proposed Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, R.000442). Otsuka represented that Otsuka approved 
the documents which were prepared by its lawyers and intended to 
execute them. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, 
R.000442). In reliance on Otsuka's representations, Wasatch and 
Appellants executed the February 1993 Lease, as well as the 
personal and corporate guaranties which are the subject of this 
xThe Memorandum from T. Michael Henderson to John Ariatti, 
attached as Exhibit P to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, is missing from the court's record. 
The Memorandum is attached as Exhibit A in the addendum hereto. 
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appeal. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. 000442; 
February 19 93 Lease, attached to Affidavit of Taylor and 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000513-521; Corporate 
Guaranty of Imaging Specialists, R.000012; Personal Guaranties of 
Levy, R.000016, Merendino, R.000020, and Taylor, R.000024). 
Contrary to Otsuka's representations, Otsuka did not execute 
the February 1993 Lease. This was not known to Wasatch and 
Appellants until discovery in this case in September, 1995. 
(Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000472). The reason that 
Otsuka did not execute the February 1993 Lease is unknown, but it 
appears that such inaction may have been deliberate. Charles 
Salzman, Otsuka's former chief financial officer and the officer 
charged with signing all leases, stated in his deposition taken 
September 14, 1995 that he did not believe that Otsuka ever 
executed the February 19 93 Lease and did not believe that Otsuka 
ever had an obligation to deliver an Otsuka MRI to Wasatch Imaging. 
(Deposition of Charles Salzman, attached as Exhibit E to 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000609-618). 
In reliance on the representations of Otsuka as set forth 
above, as well as on Otsuka's representation that it would execute 
the February 1993 Lease, Wasatch commenced the expensive renovation 
of the facility, secured construction financing from Zions First 
National Bank to pay for the construction costs, and arranged for 
working capital. Appellants in good faith guaranteed and arranged 
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for the financing. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, 
R.000443) . 
On March 10, 1993, Otsuka notified Wasatch that it would 
deliver the Otsuka MRI by the end of May 1993 . (Letter from Dale 
Grant to Richard Taylor dated March 10, 1993, attached as Exhibit 
I to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000631). 
On May 17, 1993, the FDA sent Otsuka another warning, which 
notified Otsuka that it continued to violate federal regulations. 
(Warning Letter from FDA Officer John Scharmann to Ken Nakayama 
dated May 17, 1993, attached as Exhibit 0 to Defendants' Memorandum 
in Opposition, R.00657-653) . In that correspondence, the FDA 
threatened to bring an action to enjoin Otsuka frcr. engaging in any 
further business with respect to the Otsuka MRI. Otsuka did not 
reveal this warning to Wasatch or Appellants. (Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition, R.000478). 
In July of 1993 (and without disclosing any of the afore-
mentioned material facts regarding the FDA audit, the FDA warnings, 
Otsuka's "internal audit" and decisions with regard to the Otsuka 
MRI, or the fact that Otsuka had not executed the February 1993 
Lease), Otsuka informed Wasatch Imaging that it could not deliver 
the MRI as provided by the February 1993 Lease. (Proposed Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim, R.000444). Left with a facility mostly 
completed, rapidly mounting debts, no MRI machine to justify the 
whole project, and in ignorance of the aforementioned material 
facts, Wasatch agreed to restructure the agreement with Otsuka and 
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accept an MRI manufactured by Siemens which would fit the facility 
and comply with the magnetic shielding specifications. (Proposed 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R. 000443-444) . 
The new agreement, executed on August 5, 1993, required 
Wasatch to acquire from Otsuka an inferior Siemens Medical Systems 
MRI (hereinafter, "Siemens MRI"), which Otsuka arranged to lease to 
Wasatch under terms similar to the original February 1993 Lease, 
(Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R.000444). Significant 
additional construction was necessary to accommodate the physical 
requirements of the Siemens MRI, and the August 1993 Lease provided 
for Otsuka to extend additional financing to pay for these 
improvements. (August 1993 Lease and Equipment Schedule No. 2, 
attached to Salzman Affidavit and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R.000123-131). 
The Siemens MRI was delivered to Wasatch in September of 1993, 
and Wasatch began operations at the Alta View Hospital site shortly 
thereafter. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R.000445). 
The delay in qfart up and Otsuka's misrepresentations and omissions 
caused Wasatch to experience economic difficulty and to fall behind 
in payments it owed to Otsuka under the terms of the August 19 93 
Lease. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R.000445). 
Without disclosing any of the aforementioned material facts, 
Otsuka entered into negotiations with Wasatch which culminated in 
the execution of a forbearance agreement dated July 14, 1994 
(hereafter referred to as "Forbearance") . (Proposed Amended Answer 
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and Counterclaim, R.000445-46). The Forbearance required Wasatch 
and Appellants to waive and release any claims that they had or may 
have had against Otsuka as a result of the prior lease agreement, 
in order to avoid immediate default and execution under the lease 
agreement. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, 
R.000445-46) . 
Wasatch continued to experience financial difficulty as a 
result of the delays in producing the Otsuka MRI and the eventual 
unavailability of the Otsuka MRI, and was unable to make payments 
to Otsuka. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R.000446). 
In February, 1995, Otsuka filed suit against the Appellants to 
enforce the guaranties. (Complaint, R.000001). 
Upon discovering information regarding the issues surrounding 
the FDA audit and warnings, Appellants immediately sought leave of 
the lower court to amend their answer and file a counterclaim based 
on claims of fraud and a breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. (Motion for Leave, and Proposed Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim attached thereto as Exhibit A, R.0H0425, 000428). 
Appellants also filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment which incorporated the newly-discovered 
information. (Memorandum in Opposition, R.000465). 
In those pleadings, Appellants asserted that Otsuka's apparent 
violations of the FDA regulations and internal manufacturing 
difficulties had created a situation wherein Otsuka knew that it 
could not deliver an Otsuka MRI as represented to Wasatch and 
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Appellants, and did not negotiate in good faith. (Proposed Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim, R.000447-454/ Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition, R. 000471-481) . Appellants further asserted that they 
had been deceived by Otsuka's misrepresentations and omissions on 
these matters, and that they would not have entered into the 
transaction with Otsuka had they known the true facts regarding the 
status of the Otsuka MRI. (Affidavits of Taylor, R.000498-502, 
Merendino, R.000580-583, and Levy, R.000594-597, attached as 
Exhibits B, C, and D to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition). 
Appellants submitted to the court extensive documentation of 
Otsuka's misrepresentations and omissions, including the deposition 
testimony and correspondence outlined above. 
Otsuka argued that Appellants did not adequately allege fraud 
or a breach of the good faith duty, that its actions did not amount 
to fraud, and that the Forbearance precluded any claim by 
Appellants of whatever nature. (Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Leave, R.00068 9-695/ Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.000701-706). 
On November 13, 1995, Judge Frederick denied Appellants' 
Motion to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim, citing "all reasons 
specified in the opposing memoranda and oral argument," and granted 
Otsuka's Motion for Summary Judgment "for reasons given in 
supporting memoranda and at argument." (Order of Judge Frederick, 
R.001023; Judgment R.001068). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants Imaging Specialists, Inc., Mark Levy, John 
Merendino, and Richard Taylor contend that summary judgment should 
not have been entered against them by the District Court, because 
material issues of disputed fact existed as to whether they had 
been defrauded by Otsuka. Appellants further contend that they 
should have been able to amend their answer and file a counterclaim 
against Otsuka upon discovering evidence of fraud and a breach of 
the good faith duty by Otsuka. 
Appellants contracted for and were assured of prompt delivery 
of an Otsuka Magnetic Resonance Imaging machine ("MRI"). However, 
when Otsuka negotiated and entered into the series of agreements, 
Otsuka knew or reasonably should have known that it could not 
deliver the equipment to Wasatch Imaging Ltd. ("Wasatch") because 
of an FDA audit, FDA warnings regarding Otsuka7s manufacturing 
processes, and Otsuka's own internal manufacturing problems. 
Finally, unable to deliver the machine as promised, and after 
months of delay, Otsuka put Wasatch in economic distress, and 
Wasatch was forced to lease an inferior and more expensive 
substitute machine. When Wasatch's economic distress continued, 
Otsuka compelled Wasatch to enter into the Forbearance. 
Through discovery, Appellants learned of the internal 
manufacturing problems, the FDA issues, and Otsuka's knowledge that 
these issues would have caused Appellants and Wasatch to terminate 
the transaction. Appellants immediately requested leave of Court 
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to amend their answer and file a counterclaim for fraud and 
produced evidence in support of their allegations. Otsuka claimed 
that it did not engage in fraud, and, alternatively, that the 
Appellants waived all claims for fraud or otherwise in the 
Forbearance. 
The order granting summary judgment was erroneous because 
numerous issues of material fact exist with regard to whether the 
knowledge and actions of Otsuka were fraudulent or involved a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the 
transaction. Utah law does not allow one to render oneself immune 
from fraudulent or deceitful conduct, and, accordingly, the 
Forbearance Agreement did not effect a waiver of Appellants' 
counterclaims. Further, Appellants have presented sufficient 
evidence to support a counterclaim for fraud and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The orders and Judgment 
of the court below should be reversed, and this case should be 
remanded for a trial on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF, BECAUSE APPELLANTS DISCOVERED AND PRESENTED TO THE 
COURT EVIDENCE OF FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The record demonstrates that Appellants raised genuine issues 
of material fact with regard to whether Otsuka behaved fraudulently 
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and in bad faith in connection with the negotiations, the February 
1993 Lease, the August 1993 Lease, and the Forbearance. 
After discovering the information regarding the FDA audit, FDA 
warnings, and Otsuka's internal production problems, as outlined 
above, Appellants immediately requested leave of court to file an 
amended answer and to add a counterclaim for fraud. (Defendants' 
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim, R.000425). 
Appellants argued that they would not have entered into the 
underlying contract or the forbearance had they known of Otsuka's 
material nondisclosures regarding the FDA action and manufacturing 
problems. (Affidavits of Taylor, R.000498-502, Merendino, 
R. 000580-583, and Levy, R. 000594-597, attached as Exhibits B, C, 
and D to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition) . 
Otsuka countered with the following arguments: (a) the 
defenses and counterclaim were waived by the Forbearance; (b) 
Appellants failed to adequately allege a claim for fraud; and (c) 
Otsuka never made any fraudulent misrepresentations regarding its 
ability to deliver the magnet. (Memorandum In Opposition To 
Defendants' Motion For Leave, R.000686-000690). 
These arguments by Otsuka are either contrary to Utah law or 
are unfounded in the record. Because the issue of fraud was 
properly before the court and supported by evidence, summary 
judgment was inappropriate under the facts and the law. 
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B, THE STANDARD OF REVISW IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT CASES 
Summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear from 
the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail. 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (App. 
Utah 1987) (citing Frisbee v. K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 
(Utah 1984), and Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (c) ) . A case should not be 
taken from the jury by summary judgment where there is any 
substantial dispute in the evidence. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. 
Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 600, 611 (Utah 1982) (citing Flvnn v. 
W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 509 P.2d 356 (Utah 1973)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that the rights of the 
non-moving party should be safeguarded through a careful evaluation 
of the evidence: 
The purpose of the motion for summary judgment is to 
provide a means for searching out the undisputed facts as 
shown by the submissions to the court...However, inasmuch 
as the party moved against is being defeated without the 
privilege of a trial, the court should carefully 
scrutinize the "submissions'1 and contentions he makes 
thereon to see if his contentions and proposals as to 
proof of material facts, if resolved in his favor, would 
entitle him to prevail; and if it so appears, the motion 
for summary judgment should be denied and a trial should 
be had for the purpose of resolving disputed issues of 
fact and determining the rights of the parties. 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1267-68 (Utah 1976). 
On appeal, no deference should be afforded to the trial 
court's conclusions that the facts are not in dispute, nor to the 
court's legal conclusions based on those facts. Republic Group 
Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 833 P.2d 285, 288 (Utah App. 1994) (citing 
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Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah App. 
1993)). Therefore, this Court should review de novo the trial 
court's determinations regarding triable issues of fact. 
C. APPSLLANTS PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF OTSUKA' S 
FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING 
Appellants alleged that Otsuka encouraged Wasatch and 
Appellants to enter into the February 19 93 Lease although Otsuka 
knew or had reason to know it could not deliver the MRI in time for 
the commencement of the 1993 ski season, as required by Wasatch. 
Further, Otsuka clearly had knowledge of the FDA's audit and 
warnings regarding Otsuka7s deviations from good manufacturing 
practices. Appellants have proffered evidence that Otsuka knew 
that it would have to significantly delay the manufacture and 
delivery of the MRIs in order to overhaul its design and manu-
facturing processes, or would have to suspend production in-
definitely or permanently. 
The discovery of information regarding the FDA audit, FDA 
warnings, and Otsuka's "internal audit," as discussed above, raises 
genuine issues of material fact as to: what the FDA told Otsuka, 
and when; what Otsuka knew about its ability to market and sell the 
Otsuka MRI, and when; what internal difficulties Otsuka ex-
perienced, and when; and what decisions Otsuka made with regard to 
the Otsuka MRI, and when. Contrary to the order of the court 
below, these issues cannot be resolved through summary judgment. 
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Construing the language in Otsuka7s correspondence in the 
light most favorable to Appellants, as is required on a summary 
judgment motion, the only logical conclusion is that the FDA 
"required" Otsuka to stop human scanning for some period of time, 
and may have instructed Otsuka to cease selling the Otsuka MRI. 
Further, the evidence demonstrates that Otsuka's internal pro-
duction was severely flawed. T. Michael Henderson's Internal 
Memorandum reveals that Otsuka knew that it could not in good faith 
negotiate the sale of an Otsuka MRI without disclosing these 
matters to Appellants. All of these matters are questions of fact 
to be resolved by a jury. 
Otsuka relied upon a factual allegation that it had no present 
intention, at the time it executed the Quotation, not tc deliver 
the MRI in a timely fashion. Appellants contend that Otsuka's 
disclosure obligations extended past the Quotation and the February 
1993 Lease (which Otsuka erroneously failed to execute), throughout 
the entire period when Wasatch Imaging spent hundreds of thousands 
of dollars constructing a facility for the Otsuka MRI, and to the 
time when the parties entered into the August 1993 Lease. Further, 
the time at which Otsuka learned various facts regarding the Otsuka 
MRI and developed its intent not to deliver, or reasonably knew 
that it could not deliver in light of the audit and warnings issued 
by the FDA, are clearly factual issues, inappropriate for summary 
adjudication. 
19 
Under Utah law, a promise of future performance, when made 
with a present intent not to perform and made to induce a party to 
act in reliance on that promise, constitutes actionable deceit and 
fraud. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985) (citing 
Prosser & Keeton, Torts 109, at 763, 5th ed. 1984). See also 
Cerritos Trucking Co. , 645 P. 2d at 611 (one who promises another to 
do something in the future as a condition or inducement to him to 
do anything impliedly asserts a present intent to carry out the 
promise); Berkeley Bank for COOPS V. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 805 
(Utah 1980) (to profess an intent to do or not to do, when the 
party intends the contrary, is as clear a misrepresentation and 
fraud as could be mac:-); Galloway v. Afco Development Corp., 777 
P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989) (it is settled that a misrepresenta-
tion of present promissory intention is a misrepresentation of a 
presently existing fact). 
Thus, the question of Otsuka's intent and knowledge at the 
time of negotiating and executing the relevant contracts precludes 
summary judgment. The facts presented by Appellants to the court 
below tend to demonstrate that Otsuka either knew it could not 
perform under the agreements, or made such representations 
recklessly in light of the existing facts. 
Allegations of fraud by their very nature involve factual 
disputes, and courts of this state have routinely overturned orders 
granting summary judgment in contract cases where fraud is alleged. 
See e.g. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P. 2d 1266 (Utah 1976) (summary 
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judgment reversed where defendant allegedly misrepresented the 
value of the business and its ongoing cash flow to plaintiff, the 
purchaser of the business); Conder v. A. L. Williams & Associates, 
Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987) (summary judgment reversed in 
case of employer who allegedly misrepresented the nature of work to 
prospective employee). 
Similarly, allegations that a party breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing are generally not amenable to summary 
disposition. A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985) . Whether 
a party has breached a contract is generally "a factual issue to be 
determined by [the fact finder] after consideration of all 
attendant circumstances and evidence." Western Farm Credit Bank, 
860 P.2d at 380 (citations omitted). Since good faith and fair 
dealing are fact-sensitive issues, summary judgment on such claims 
is generally inappropriate. Western Farm Credit Bank, 860 P.2d at 
380. 
Utah case law demonstrates that appellants properly raised 
triable material issues of fact with regard to whether Otsuka 
engaged in fraud and violated the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. In Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), 
plaintiff sued the defendants to recover on a promissory note. 
Defendants asserted that plaintiff's representatives told them that 
their personal signatures on the notes were for "appearance only," 
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and that no action would ever be taken for collection. Prior to 
the adjudication of the summary judgment pleading, each defendant 
filed an affidavit outlining the fraud in the inducement of the 
obligation. Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 664. The trial judge granted 
plaintiff's summary judgment motion. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c), both the pleading and the affidavits, to the extent 
that they set forth facts admissible in evidence, bear on the 
determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 
that would preclude summary judgment." Union Bank, 707 P. 2d at 
666, fn2, citing Rainford v. Tvttinc, 451 P.2d 769, (Utah 1969) . 
The Court found the pleadings and affidavits sufficient to survive 
summary j udgment: 
Both the answer and the affidavits allege specific misrepre-
sentation by a bank officer that led appellants to believe 
they would not be held personally liable. Further, the 
affidavits assert that without the misrepresentations 
appellants would not have personally signed the note... [These 
allegations] raise a genuine issue of material fact relative 
to whether appellants' personal execution of the note was 
fraudulently induced." Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 6 66. 
In Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P. 2d 1316 (Utah App. 
1991) , a deed of trust had been recorded on the plaintiffs' home in 
favor of defendant as security for a lease financing industrial 
equipment. Like the defendants in Union Bank, the plaintiffs in 
Larson had filed amended pleadings and affidavits in the trial 
court offering evidence or testimony that they were induced to 
enter the lease by defendant's fraudulent representations. 
22 
Nonetheless, the trial court granted summary judgment for 
defendant. This Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs' 
allegations supported a claim of fraud: "[Defendant] proffered no 
evidence to counter the [plaintiffs'] allegations ... other than a 
bald assertion that fraud did not exist. Accordingly, there was no 
basis for the trial court to grant summary judgment on the issue of 
fraud." Larson, 818 P.2d at 1321-22. 
Like the appellants in Union Bank and Larson, Appellants in 
this case alleged in their pleadings and affidavits that they were 
promised something, i.e., delivery of an Otsuka MR I within a 
reasonable time, and on the basis of that promise, they signed the 
guaranties. Appellants signed Affidavits in the proceeding below 
attesting that if they had known the facts regarding the FDA audit, 
FDA warnings, Otsuka's internal problems, and Otsuka's failure to 
execute the February 1993 Lease, they would not have signed the 
guaranties or entered into the transaction. (Affidavits of Taylor, 
R.000498-502, Merendino, R.000580-583 , and Levy, R.000594-597, 
attached as Exhibits B, C, and D to Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition). 
It is clear from the record herein that Appellants made a case 
for fraud sufficient to defeat summary judgment. As in Larson, the 
record below is void of any evidence submitted by Otsuka to 
contradict fraud. Rather, Otsuka offers an assurance that it "did 
not make any fraudulent misrepresentations about its ability to 
timely deliver the Otsuka MRI system," (Memorandum in Opposition 
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to Defendants' Motion for Leave, R.000690), and argues in the 
alternative that the Forbearance precludes Appellants' claims. 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Leave, 
R.000701). As discussed herein, the Forbearance argument is 
without legal foundation. Thus, there was no basis for summary 
judgment as a factual dispute was clearly present. 
Otsuka's representatives made several misrepresentations and 
omissions pertaining to Otsuka's ability to deliver the Otsuka MRI. 
Thus, this Court must conclude that the uncontroverted evidence in 
the record clearly illustrates a genuine dispute of material fact 
as to whether Otsuka knew or should have known it could not deliver 
the Otsuka MRI on time or at all. 
Despite a record inundated with both allegations and prima 
facie proof of fraud and bad faith dealing, the trial court decided 
this matter in favor of Otsuka summarily and as a matter of law. 
As neither the facts herein nor law of this State support that 
order, a reversal and remand are mandated. 
II. THE FORBEARANCE IS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED BY FRAUD 
AND IS AN ATTEMPT BY OTSUKA TO ABSOLVE ITSELF OF LIABILITY FOR 
FRAUD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Judge Frederick denied Appellants the opportunity to present 
their claim and proof of fraud to the trier of fact for "all 
reasons specified in the opposing memoranda and oral argument." 
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(Order of Judge Frederick, R.001023). Judge Frederick offered no 
further rationale for his opinion. 
Presumably, Judge Frederick was persuaded by Otsuka's argument 
that even if Appellants had a valid claim for fraud, the Forbear-
ance precluded any litigation of that claim. In its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
(R.000697), Otsuka argues that the following language in the 
forbearance is absolute and controlling: 
"Wasatch and Guarantors hereby waive and release 
any known or unknown claims, causes of action or 
suits of any kind, character or nature whatsoever, 
fixed or contingent, which Wasatch or Guarantors 
may have or claim against ORIX or Otsuka which may 
arise out of or be connected with any acts of 
commission or omission by ORIX or Otsuka, existing 
or occurring on or prior to the date of this for-
bearance agreement, including, without limitations, 
any claims arising with respect to the equipment 
lease, related documents, or the collateral or the 
guarantees." (Forbearance, as quoted in Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R.000702). 
Otsuka argues, in effect, that it is perfectly legal to 
indemnify or insulate oneself from any act of fraud or deceit, so 
long as the aggrieved party is willing to waive their rights in 
this regard, irrespective of whether or not that party is aware of 
the deceit or transgression. This argument misstates the law. 
B. FORBEARANCE AGREEMENTS PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD ARE VOID 
In Utah, is not now nor has it ever been legal for a party to 
shield itself from liability or contract away liability for deceit. 
Moreover, an issue as to whether there was fraud in the inducement 
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of a forbearance precludes summary judgment. Norton v. Blackham, 
669 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1993) (a factual issue as to whether a 
defendant obtained a release by misrepresentation will preclude 
summary judgment). 
The Supreme Court of this State has soundly rejected con-
tractual clauses which limit liability for fraud. Lamb v. Banaart, 
525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974). In Lamb, the defendants sold some 
livestock to plaintiffs and warranted that all of the animals were 
offspring of a farmer's bull. In reality, most were not. 
Plaintiffs sued on grounds of fraud, and the defendants countered 
by claiming that a clause in the sale agreement limited defendants' 
liability to an amount of bull semen that defendants had previously 
stockpiled. Judgment was entered against the defendants, and the 
jury made a specific finding of fraud and punitive damages. 
Defendants appealed, arguing that the contract offered an exclusive 
remedy to the buyers. The Supreme Court affirmed: 
[A] contract clause limiting liability will not be 
applied to a fraud action. The law does not permit a 
covenant of immunity which will protect a person against 
his own fraud on the grounds of public policy. A 
contract limitation on damages or remedies is valid onlv 
in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud. Lamb, 
525 P.2d at 608. 
The Court expanded upon the reasoning in Lamb in Ona Intn'l 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). In 
Ona, plaintiffs brought suit against a former partner for fraud. 
Plaintiffs had invested in a mausoleum, and alleged that a large 
number of internment crypts at the mausoleum were made of plywood, 
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not concrete as was represented to plaintiffs prior to purchase. 
Ona, 850 P. 2d at 450. Prior to the discovery of the inferior 
quality of construction, plaintiffs had experienced unrelated 
business problems concerning the day-to-day operations of the 
mausoleum, and decided to purchase outright one of the partner's 
interests in the business. The "Partnership Redemption Agreement" 
contained the following language: 
Release by the Partnership: Except as otherwise provided 
in this agreement, the partnership, it's partners, their 
respective agents, officers, employees, successors, 
assigns and heirs, and each of them, forever discharges 
SLtMN, its agents, officers and employees, from any and 
all claims, demands, rights of action, whether known or 
unknown, however arising, which in any way are based upon 
or related to SLxMN's association with the partnership. 
Ona, 850 P.2d at 451. 
Later, after the fraud was discovered, representatives of the 
plaintiffs testified that they would not have signed the redemption 
agreement containing the release if they had known that the 
representations about the crypts were false. One, at 450. 
(Appellants herein have offered similar sworn testimony in their 
affidavits. See Affidavits of Taylor, R.000498-502, Merendino, 
R.000580-583, and Levy, R.000594-597, attached as Exhibits B, C, 
and D to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition). 
The defendants claimed that the language in the release 
unambiguously barred the plaintiffs from bringing suit against 
defendants for their fraudulent conduct. At trial, the Judge read 
to the jury the following instruction, derived from a similar 
instruction used by the court in Lamb v. Banaart: 
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A release of liability is a type of contract and may 
generally be rescinded for fraud as with other contracts. 
For public policy reasons, the law does not permit a 
contract to contain a covenant of immunity that would 
protect a party against his own fraud. A release in a 
contract is invalid where the contract itself containing 
the release was fraudulently induced. Ona, 850 P.2d at 
452, fn.6. 
As in Lamb, the Court in One held that a contract limitation 
on damages or remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations 
or proof of fraud. Ong, 850 P.2d at 452. "Fraudulent inducement 
sufficient to nullify a contract... can vitiate a release. This is 
hornbook law." Ong, 850 P.2d at 453, (citations omitted). See 
also Horaan v. Ind. Desian Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982) (a 
release is a type of contract and may generally be enforced or 
rescinded on the same grounds as other contracts). 
Accordingly, a release will be voidable if it was an integral 
part of a scheme to defraud: 
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged, and the jury 
found that the defendants committed fraud against 
plaintiffs in the sale of the Mausoleum under both the 
purchase and the redemption agreements. That fraud 
included the false representation that the pavilion 
crypts were built of the same material, i.e. concrete, as 
the indoor mausoleum crypts. Moreover, during the course 
of the partnership, defendants failed to reveal the true 
nature of the crypt construction. Procurement of the 
Release was an integral and continuing part of de-
fendants' willful misrepresentations and omissions 
concerning the construction of the crypts plaintiffs 
purchased. It cannot be separated from the fraudulently 
induced contract in which it is contained." Ona, 850 
P.2d at 453 . 
Ona and similar cases mandate that the order of summary 
judgment against Appellants here must be reversed and this case 
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remanded for trial. As the record cited herein clearly demon-
strates, Otsuka made fraudulent representations and omissions of 
material fact, i.e., that the FDA was auditing Otuska; that the FDA 
had issued extensive warnings to Otuska; that Otsuka was "required" 
to cease human scanning; that scanning involving humans had ceased 
with regard to all existing Otsuka MRIs; that Otsuka decided to 
halt production of the Otsuka MRI; and that Otsuka believed the FDA 
issues would cause a purchaser "to choke." 
Wasatch and Appellants were induced to negotiate with Otsuka, 
enter into the February 1993 Lease, enter into the August 1993 
Lease, and enter into the Forbearance, all on the fraudulent 
foundation laid by Otsuka regarding the supposed availability of 
the Otsuka MRI. Throughout the course of transactions with Wasatch 
and Appellants, Otsuka failed to correct its material misrepre-
sentations and omissions. Furthermore, Otsuka set up the condition 
of economic distress that compelled Wasatch Imaging to enter into 
the modified lease and Forbearance. Should this Court allow the 
order of summary judgment to stand, then Otsuka would be allowed to 
enjoy the fruits of its deceit. 
In the proceedings below, Otsuka relied on case law outside of 
this jurisdiction as authority for its contention that the 
forbearance agreement is binding on Appellants. However, a review 
of the law reveals that states generally do not allow a party to be 
indemnified for fraud, and a review of the cases cited by Otsuka 
reveals that they do not lend the support claimed. 
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For example, under Oklahoma law, a release executed by an 
injured party may be set aside if its execution was induced or 
brought about by fraudulent statements or representations. Tulsa 
Citv Lines, Inc. v. Mains, 107 F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir. 1939) . 
Minnesota Courts have routinely struck down releases allowing one 
to benefit from deceit. In Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau 
Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971), the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit held that despite the presence of a strongly 
worded limitation of liability clause in the contract, the 
disclaimer could not shield a party from liability for fraud. "The 
law should not, and does not, permit a covenant of immunity to be 
drawn that will protect a person against his own fraud. Such is 
not enforceable because of public policy....It is the purpose of 
the law to shield only those whose armor embraces good faith." 
Clements, 444 F.2d at 177-78. 
Curiously, Otsuka relies on New York law to provide foundation 
for its position, citing a 1984 decision in the case of Herman H. 
Schwartz, Inc. v. Citv of New York, 473 N.Y.S.2d 564 (N.Y. App. 
1984) , as buttressing its contention that a release bars claims for 
fraud. However, a careful reading of Schwartz reveals that the 
court did not hold that a release bars fraud claims. Rather, the 
court held that the particular facts of the case demonstrated that 
there had been full disclosure of the issues which gave rise to the 
claim of fraud, that the conduct of the defendant in requiring the 
waiver was not unconscionable, and that the appellant failed to 
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raise a triable issue. Schwartz, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 612. Thus, not 
only is Schwartz factually distinguishable from this case, it does 
not hold that releases may generally bar fraud claims. 
Anheuser-Busch Co. Inc. v. Summit Coffee Co.. 858 S.W.2d 928 
(Tex.App. 1993) is also cited prominently in Otsuka's motion on 
this matter to Judge Frederick. Contrary to Otsuka's contention, 
Anheuser-Busch does not hold that liability for fraud may be 
contracted away. In fact, the Anheuser-Busch court held that the 
release in question did not bar a securities fraud claim, in part 
because neither the buyer nor the parent company had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the facts giving rise to the fraud claim. 
Anheuser-Busch, 858 S.W.2d at 935. 
In TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 845 F.Supp. 1459 (D.Kan. 1994), the 
court held that under New York law, the factual question of fraud 
on a securities issue precluded summary judgment, and that the 
provisions of a stock purchase agreement limiting the seller's 
liability to the purchase price of the stock was not enforceable to 
shelter sellers from liability for the full amount of the damages 
caused by their fraudulent acts. Citing Kalish-Jarcho v. Citv of 
New York. 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749-50 (N.Y. App. 1983) and other 
cases, the court found ample precedent to invalidate a release 
which purports to eliminate a fraud claim: 
An exculpatory agreement, no matter how flat and un-
qualified its terms, will not exonerate a party from 
liability under all circumstances....An exculpatory 
clause is unenforceable when, in contravention of 
acceptable notions of morality, the misconduct for which 
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it would grant immunity smacks of intentional wrong-
doing . . . A contract to take a thing with all faults 
does not mean that it is to be taken with all frauds. 
TGB, at 1462. 
See also Youna Fehlhaber Pile Co., Inc. v. State, 30 N.Y.S.2d 192, 
195 (N.Y. App. 1941) (a party cannot evade liability for misprepre-
sentation by an exculpatory clause in the contract). 
In 1993, the Court of Appeals of Ohio found that under the law 
of New York, a forbearance procured through fraud is not to be 
enforced. In Allied Paper, Inc. v. H.M. Holdings, Inc., 619N.E.2d 
1121, 86 Ohio App.3d 8, cert, den. 67 Ohio St.3d 1437 (1993), a 
stock purchaser alleged breach of environmental warranties by the 
seller. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's order of 
summary judgment, concluding that the exculpation clause contained 
in the contract applied only to liability arising out of the 
contract itself: 
Under New York law, a contract cannot insulate a person 
from liability for fraud in making the contract. 
Enforcing such a provision would violate the public 
policy and destroy the barriers that have been erected 
against fraudulent dealings. The New York Court of 
Appeals stated in 1894 [that] 'a party who has 
perpetrated a fraud upon his neighbor may not contract 
with him, in the very instrument by means of which it was 
perpetrated, for immunity against its consequences, close 
his mouth from complaining of it, and bind him never to 
seek redress. Public policy and morality are both 
ignored if such an agreement can be given effect in a 
court of justice.' Allied Paper, at 1128. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed analogous facts in 
Robberecht Seafood v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 
1979) . In Robberecht, a seafood merchant sued the seller of an 
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airplane, alleging that the seller had represented that the plane 
had passed all inspections required by law and was capable of 
transporting 40,000 pounds of cargo 2,700 miles. These assertions 
proved to be false. However, the sales agreement stated that the 
plane was "accepted in an 'as is where is' condition and waived 
'all warranties, guarantees, conditions or liabilities7 including 
all liability for direct or consequential damages." Robberecht, 
255 S.E.2d at 683. The trial court, believing the language in the 
forbearance to be absolute and controlling, granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant. 
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded: 
While, as defendant says, contracting parties may waive 
their contractual rights and disclaim or limit certain 
liabilities, a false representation of a material fact, 
constituting an inducement to the contract, on which the 
purchaser had a right to rely, is always ground for 
rescission of the contract by a court of equity . . . . 
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant made fraudulent 
representations of material fact and that the sale 
contract was induced by defendant's fraud. Defendants 
denied those allegations. Summary judgment shall not be 
entered if any material fact is genuinely in dispute." 
Robberecht, 255 S.E.2d at 683-84 (citations omitted). 
Utah courts, and courts throughout the country hold that a 
party may not protect itself from liability for fraud. Also, 
forbearance procured through fraud is per se void. Because 
material issues of fact exist with regard to these issues, the 
Order of the court below must be reversed. 
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III. THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ALLOW APPELLANTS TO AMEND THEIR 
ANSWER AND ASSERT A COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST OTSUKA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Upon discovering information regarding the FDA audit, FDA 
warnings, Otsuka's "internal audit," and the fact that Otsuka did 
not execute the February 1993 Lease, Appellants promptly filed a 
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim. The 
District Court denied Appellants' Motion at the same time the Court 
granted Otsuka's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Minute Entry of 
Judge Frederick, R.001023; Order of Judge Frederick, R.001059-
1063) . 
Because Appellants timely filed this motion and presented 
ample evidence to support asserting a defense and a counterclaim 
based on Otsuka's fraud and breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, the ruling of the District Court was erroneous 
and should be reversed. 
B. APPELLANTS' PROPOSED AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM WAS 
TIMELY FILED AND IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO OTSUKA 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." Andalex 
Resources, Inc. v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1991) . 
Relevant factors in determining whether leave should be granted are 
the timeliness of the motion, the reason for the delay, and the 
resulting prejudice to the responding party. Mountain American 
Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App. 1993). The 
primary consideration in the analysis is whether the opposing party 
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will have an adequate opportunity to address the newly-raised 
matters. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981). 
Appellants timely filed their motion. In response to 
Appellants' discovery requests, on September 19, 1995, Otsuka 
produced certain documents, and Charles Salzman, former chief 
financial officer of Otsuka testified at his deposition. 
(Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition, R.000478, and Affidavit of 
Taylor attached thereto as Exhibit B, R.000499-501). This 
information revealed for the first time the existence of the FDA 
audit, the FDA warnings, Otsuka's internal decisions with regard to 
the Otsuka MRI, and that Otsuka had failed to execute the February 
1993 Lease and did not consider itself bound by that lease. 
Appellants filed their Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and 
Add Counterclaim on October 6, 1995, just two and one-half weeks 
after this information was obtained. Further, this information was 
obtained from Otsuka pursuant to production requests and deposition 
notices. Otsuka itself was in control of the dissemination of the 
information and would not be prejudiced if Appellants were allowed 
to assert additional defenses and counterclaims. In addition, 
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Otsuka would have an adequate opportunity to address these matters.2 
C. APPELLANTS/ PROPOSED AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
PROPERLY ALLEGE CLAIMS FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
1. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND OMISSION 
In Utah, the essential elements in a fraud action are: (1) 
that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) 
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) 
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced 
to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). 
Misrepresentation may also be made by material omission where 
there exists a duty to speak. A seller has a duty to represent 
fairly and accurately the material elements of property sold when 
such elements are not easily ascertainable by the buyer and 
materially affect the value of the property. Qna Int'1 (U.S.A.) v 
11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah 1993). In this case, 
Otsuka possessed all information regarding the FDA audit and 
2In fact, Otsuka did not claim that it would be prejudiced 
if Appellants' Motion for Leave were granted. Instead, Otsuka 
alleged that Appellants had failed to adequately assert its 
claims and that the Forbearance invalidated such claims. 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Leave, 
R.000686) . 
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warnings, as well information regarding its "internal audit" and 
internal decisions regarding the Otsuka MRI. Otsuka thus had a 
duty to represent the material elements of the Otuska MRI fairly 
and accurately. 
Appellants pleaded all essential elements of a fraud claim. 
Appellants pleaded that Otsuka assured them of FDA approval, 
promised delivery in order for Wasatch Imaging to meet its time 
requirements, and promised that Otsuka would execute the February 
11, 1993 lease agreement. Appellants further pleaded that Otsuka 
failed to disclose: the FDA audit; the FDA warnings; the apparent 
FDA order to halt human scanning; the fact that human scanning was 
halted; the internal manufacturing problems; the decision by Otsuka 
to stop taking orders for the Otsuka MRI. Otsuka knew that these 
representations were false or made them recklessly. Otsuka knew 
that the FDA action would cause "the creek to rise" and a customer 
"to choke." 
Appellants pleaded that Otsuka's motive was to induce them to 
contract to purchase an Otsuka MRI. Otsuka encouraged Wasatch 
Imaging to enter into the February 1993 lease agreement and begin 
extensive and costly renovations to the facility, and then enter 
into the August 1993 Lease, and finally, into the Forbearance. 
Appellants relied on those representations and omissions, and 
entered into the agreements. Appellants allege that they suffered 
financial harm as a result of Otsuka's actions. 
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Since Appellants pleaded an appropriate fraud claim, the 
District Court committed error in denying Appellants' Motion for 
Leave to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim. 
2. BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING 
A covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if 
not all, contractual relationships. St. Benedict's Development Co. 
v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991). 
Under this covenant, each party impliedly promises not to 
"intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or 
injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the 
contract." St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 199. To comply with the 
obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's actions 
must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified 
expectations of the other party. Id. An examination of the 
express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine whether 
there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Id. The purpose, intentions, and expectations of 
the parties should be determined by considering the contract 
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the 
parties. Id. 
Appellants properly pleaded a claim for breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Appellants alleged that Appellants 
contracted with Otsuka for the purchase of a high-quality Otuska 
MRI for immediate installation and operation. Appellants alleged 
38 
that Otsuka breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing contained in the agreements and the Forbearance, in that 
Otsuka took action which destroyed or injured Appellants' right to 
receive the benefits for which they contracted, i.e. the timely 
delivery of an Otsuka MRI. (Proposed Amended Answer and Counter-
claim, R. 000452) . 
Otsuka breached the implied covenant by: failing to execute 
the February 1993 Lease; failure to disclose the FDA audit; failing 
to disclose the results of the FDA audit and that the FDA required 
Otsuka to cease human scanning; and failure to disclose the 
internal decision to stop shipping the Otsuka MRI. (Proposed 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, R.000452-453). 
Because Appellants properly pleaded claims for fraud and for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the order 
denying Appellant's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Add 
Counterclaim should be reversed and the amendment allowed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Appellants assert that Otsuka made material misrepresentations 
and omissions to Wasatch and Appellants, and have discovered 
substantial evidence of such fraud and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. Appellants further assert that they 
would not have entered into any contract or forbearance with Otsuka 
had they known of these misrepresentations or omissions. 
Appellants brought the allegation of fraud and bad faith to the 
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attention of the trial court, and presented evidence of such 
behavior at great length in the pleadings and oral arguments at the 
hearing on the motions. 
Otsuka claims that the Forbearance nullifies all claims and 
defenses, including fraud. Appellants respectfully assert that 
this contention is contrary to legal authority in Utah and the 
majority of states. 
Appellants have raised the issue of fraud and bad faith, and 
Otsuka denies engaging in such behavior. Appellants respectfully 
contend that there is no clearer indicia of genuine material 
factual dispute than the one currently before this Court. It is 
for the jury to determine whether the representations were of such 
a character and made under such circumstances that they were likely 
to deceive. Berkeley, 607 P.2d at 801, citing Lewis v. White, 269 
P.2d 865 (Utah 1954) . 
For the reasons stated above, Appellants respectfully request 
that this Court reverse the order granting Otsuka's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, reverse the order denying Appellants' Motion to 
Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim, and remand this matter for a 
trial on the merits. 
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I spoke with Rick's attorney today and the final documents should be signed on Friday 
or the first of the week. What is holding up the signing is a new partnership 
agre^ment(whict) was the reason we had to change all the documents in the first 
place). 
I also spoke with Mike Auhlln, the builder. He said Rick was pretty sure he had the 
construction financing done at his Dank. 
If the cre^k don't rise(and the FDA doesnl cause them to choke) we should have 
another deal done next week. And they will start construction -1 like that stage cf the 
deal. 
Dale - the Graham deal is very hot 1 get calls from the everyday re approval 
because they want to stan building. We should have approval on Friday or first cf the 
week. Do we need to incorporate anything Into the lease re the recent change of 
events . My preference would to do It thought a modified quotation. The quotation is 
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1 I NOVEMBER 13, 1995 - 9:00 A.M. - SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
2 I 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 
5 THE COURT: Let me call the calendar. 
6 Number two is the matter of Templeton versus Hill. 
7 Are there appearances in that matter? 
8 THE CLERK: I think they're outside. 
9 THE COURT: Are they? Number three, this 
10 is Otsuka versus Imaging Specialists. Appearances in 
11 that matter. 
12 MR. ORTON: Yes, your Honor. Willis Orton 
13 and Ron Price for the defendants. 
I 
14 I MR. DOCTORMAN: Gary Doctorman for the 
15 plaintiff, your Honor. | 
16 THE COURT: Very well, counsel. Come j 
i 
I 
17 forward. We'll take your matter at this point, there | 
18 I being no one else here at the moment. 
19 I This is in the matter of Otsuka 
i 
20 I Electronics versus Imaging Specialists/ etc., case 
21 | number C-950901173. And let me state for the record I 
22 I have previously reviewed the rather extensive 
23 pleadings both in support of and in opposition to the 
24 plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and in 
25 support of and opposition to the defendant's cross 
•SCCKY MwUNTAlK REFORTIfcG SERVICE, ISC 
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1 motion for summary judgment. I must, counsel, limit 
2 I your presentations. Mr. Doctorman, since you filed 
your motion earlier on, first I'll hear from you. And 
I must limit your presentation to 15 minutes per side, 
5 I counsel• 
6 I You may proceed, Mr. Doctorman. 
7 J MR. DOCTORMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 Gary Doctorman for tho plaintiff, Otsuka. 
9 Your Honor, this case is much simpler than 
10 the implications of complexity demonstrated by the 
11 I number of memoranda you have received. The case is as 
12 simple as Otsuka is seeking to enforce a written 
13 guarantee, and the guarantors have briefed two 
14 I defenses: failure of consideration and fraud. J 
i 
15 There is no factual dispute that the J 
16 guarantors sicned and delivered the guarantees. The | 
17 guarantees related to the leasehold improvements did | 
i 
i 
18 not at all relate to the MRI system. But the j 
} i 
19 guarantors are financially interested in Wasatch, that j 
i 
20 Wasatch signed the lease, the amended and restated 
21 lease to pay for the use of the leasehold 
22 improvements; that the parties signed the August 5th, 
23 1993 letter agreement which states that Wasatch 
24 released Otsuka from the obligation to deliver the 
25 Otsuka machine, and everybody consented to the 
ROCKY S0UJITAI3 REPORTING nEJVvICb, TNC-
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1 substitution of the Seamon's machine. There was nc 
2 | dispute that Wasatch will net pay for or return the 
3 leasehold improvements, or the MRI, for that matter, 
4 I and the balance due has not at all been challenged. 
5 I'd like to approach the bench with copies 
6 of the critical documents signed by the guarantors 
7 that have been highlighted to show the matters that 
8 I'm going to talk about today. 
9 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
10 MR. DOCTORMAN: Thank you, your Honor, and 
11 I have copies for counsel, also. 
12 Your Honor, I've handed you three 
13 documents: The personal guarantee, the August 5th 
14 letter agreement and the forbearance agreement. All 
15 have been attached to affidavits. However, when 
16 attached to affidavits they were not highlighted as 
17 ! indicated here today for demonstrative purposes, 
i 
18 Also, your Honor, I have highlighted portions of the 
19 personal guarantees and have enlarged them, which I'd 
20 like to put that up now. With this, your Honor, I 
21 have highlighted critical words and phrases that I'll 
22 be discussing, if I can reach that high. 
23 THE COURT: There's a ruler over there if 
24 you want to use it, or a pointer. I think it's over 
25 by the calendar. 
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1 MR. DOCTORMAN: Thank ycu. 
2 I Let's examine the guarantees first. 
3 What's critical, your Honor, is this is an 
4 unconditional guarantee, unconditional guarantee of 
5 payment. "Unconditional guarantee" has been ruled 
6 upon by the Utah Supreme Court as to what that means 
7 in Walter B. Heller, Western, Inc., versus U.S. 
8 Rockwell. In that caEe the Court said that the trial 
9 court should not look at the underlying loan -- in 
10 this case, it's a lease -- because the underlying 
11 transaction is not at all pertinent to the guarantor's 
12 liability on an unconditional guarantee. And we 
13 assert that when the guarantor signed an unconditional 
14 guarantee, there is no reason, according to the U.S. 
15 Rockwell case, Walter Heller case, to look at the 
16 underlying transaction. 
17 I Ctsuka arranged $275,000 in financing for 
18 the leaseholds. Wasatch accepted it. They signed the 
19 I amended and restated lease. They promised to pay. 
20 They will not pay and they will not return the lease 
21 pursuant to the property, pursuant to the contract 
22 terms. 
23 The guarantors had unconditionally 
24 guaranteed that payment. U.S. Rockwell says don't 
25 look at all the things that the guarantors want you to 
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look at, and that's the underlying transaction. Bur, 
your Honor, you don't even have to go so far, if you 
don't want to, to look at the Walter Heller versus 
U.S. Rockwell case, to determine what the parties 
contractually agreed to that "unconditional11 meant. 
The guarantors assert that they should not 
have to honor their guarantees because Otsuka had 
contacted Wasatch after default and demanded the 
payment or threatened to foreclose. Even if that's 
true, the guarantors ignore this contractual language: 
"Guarantors expressly waives all defenses which might 
constitute a legal or equitable discharge of a surety 
or guarantor and agrees this guarantee shall be valid 
and unconditionally binding on guarantor, regardless 
of the ascertation by Otsuka against Wasatch of any of 
Otsuka's rights and remedies provided for under the 
lease or existing in its favor in law, equity, etc." 
Contractually, they agreed to that. 
The guarantors claim that the guarantees 
apply only to the February lease, but the guarantors 
ignore the contractual provisions of the guarantee. 
This guarantee says that they guarantee payment when 
due of all sums presently or hereafter owing by 
Wasatch to Otsuka, thereunder. Now they say well, 
that's not the hereafter of the February lease. But 
?CCK^ MCTJN?>.lr* RLrORTXNG SERVICE, INC 
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they also ignore these words: "Guarantor further 
agrees that this guarantee shall remain and continue 
3 I in full force and effect, notwithstanding any renewal, 
4 I modification or extension of the lease." 
5 And that's exactly what happened in 
6 August. There was a renewal — excuse me — a 
7 modification of the lease in August. The parties 
8 consented to a modification. And they consented and 
9 waived all notice to such renewal, modification or 
10 extension. But nevertheless, even though they waived 
11 notice; they participated in the August 5th letter 
12 I agreement and were given notice of the substitution of 
13 I the Seamon's machine for the Otsuka machine, and they 
14 at that point reaffirmed their guarantee. 
15 The guarantors assert that the February 
16 lease was invalid because Otsuka did not sign it in 
17 February, but as we assert, signed it later pursuant 
18 to the amended and restated lease when they signed 
19 that in August. But the guarantors ignore the 
20 I contractually agreed-upon language. Again, "The 
21 j guarantee shall be valid and unconditionally binding 
22 upon guarantors regardless, of the release of Wasatch 
23 from any of its obligations under the lease by Otsuka 
24 by operation of law or otherwise." 
25 So that says the February lease, not 
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1 signing the February lease, they contractually agreed 
2 that that has no -- the release of Wasatch from the 
3 February lease has no implication on this proceeding. 
4 Also they consented to any invalidly, irregularity, cr 
5 defect or unenforceability of any provision of the 
6 lease. Again, really applying the definition that 
7 U,S, Rockwell applies that underlying transaction is 
8 not pertinent to an unconditional guarantae. 
9 Let's take a moment and turn to the August 
10 5th letter. I have not blown that up, but we have 
11 highlighted it. You'll note that on the second page 
12 the guarantors did sign that. There's multiple — 
13 it's been signed in counterpart, your Honor, so that's 
14 why they don't appear on all the pages, but Mr. 
15 Taylor's appears on that first one. 
16 The letter starts out: "Because Otsuka's 
17 unable to deliver an MRI and because you advised us 
18 you're unable to wait for Otsuka to be able to deliver 
19 an MRI, we propose modifications to our agreement. If 
20 the proposal's acceptable, please have the guarantors 
2 1 sign it." 
22 They terminated the quotation on Schedule 
23 1. Schedule 1 is the MRI, the Otsuka MRI machine. 
24 They amended, they restated Schedule 2, and that's the 
25 leasehold improvements. And as you read through 
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1 there, they agreed to substitute the Seamon's machine 
2 for the Otsuka machine. 
3 On page 2 they release Otsuka with respect 
4 to any cbligation under the Otsuka quotation or 
5 Schedule 1, or under the master lease, for any costs, 
6 expenses or liability incurred with respect to the 
7 I termination of the Otsuka quotation or Schedule 1. 
8 I And then at the bottom, "The guarantors consent to the 
9 foregoing and reaffirm the respective undertakings to 
10 Otsuka and its assignees," and then they signed as 
11 guarantors . 
12 When they signed this, your Honor, they 
13 knew two things: They knew that Otsuka had not 
14 delivered the Otsuka machine for whatever reason. 
15 They knew that. And they also knew that they had not 
16 received a copy of a signed February lease; nor is 
17 there any evidence that they asked for a signed copy 
18 of the February lease; nor is there any evidence that 
19 at that time it was important to them to get a copy of 
20 the February lease. If it was, they would have asked 
21 for it. But there's no evidence of that. 
22 The guarantors claim no consideration for 
23 the guarantees. Consideration requires two things: 
24 Benefit; detriment. Ra3ser versus H o m e tells us 
25 that. Here, clearly Otsuka had $275,000 in detriment. 
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1 Wasatch and the guarantors had a $275,000 benefit by 
2 receiving the financing for the leasehold 
3 improvements. 
4
 Even if everything that the guarantors own 
5 says by sworn statement the issue of consideration is 
6 true, the guarantors contractually consented to the 
7 modifications, to the invalidity of the February 
8 lease, consented to the substitution of the Seamon's 
9 machine, and they reaffirmed their undertakings at the 
10 time that they did that, $275,000 is sufficient 
11 benefi.t and detriment to form consideration* 
12 The second defense that the guarantors 
13 raise is fraud. The guarantors' contractual 
14 approach — excuse me -- tactical approach is to say 
15 fraud as often as they can and hope that you will give 
16 them a trial. But for the guarantors to use fraud as 
17 a defense to summary judgment, they must show by sworn 
18 I statement all of the elements of fraud, with 
19 particularity, that would be admissible at trial. 
20 Fraud is an extremely serious allegation. 
21 The guarantors cannot rely on unsworn statements in 
22 their counsel's briefs or arguments. They must rely 
23 on sworn statements and admissible evidence. The 
24 guarantors have chosen to defend on fraud, and they 
25 brief fraud, and they've provided affidavits of 
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1 Taylor, Merendino and Wheatley which they assert to 
2 show fraud. But those sworn statements do not show 
3 fraud, your Honor. 
4 Having made the election to defend on 
5 fraud, they cannot be heard later after they amend 
6 their complaint to try and allege and show fraud 
7 | again. There are some elements of fraud, your Honor, 
8 that no amount of discovery request that they ask 
9 Otsuka and/or Elsin to produce, will help them show 
10 fraud, because the information is in their sole 
11 possession. And those elements are: The statements 
12 that the guarantors made to Otsuka and the damages 
13 that resulted from the fraud. We can't, no matter how 
14 much discovery they do upon us, if they can't show 
15 those two elements from their own, there's no reason 
16 to go on with this case. 
17 I Despite being argued in their brief, 
18 there's no sworn statement that the guarantors told 
19 Otsuka that time was of the essence in delivering the 
20 MRI, much less laying a foundation of when they said 
21 it, who they said it to. There is no indication in 
22 their affidavit that they did that. There's no sworn 
23 statement that the guarantors told Otsuka that there 
24 would be harm to Wasatch if the Otsuka MRI was not 
25 delivered by the ski season. And for that matter 
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1 again, your Honor, there's no foundation for that, 
2 when they said it, who they said it to, who said it. 
3 That has not been shown with particularly as required 
4 for showing fraud. 
5 If the matter of the "they needed it by 
6 ski season" was said in May -- they don't tell us 
7 when it was said -- but if it was said in May, then 
8 all of their claims for material omissions to talk 
9 about the FDA audit that occurred back in February are 
10 moot, because if there is no sworn testimony that the 
11 delivery date was critical to them, then there is no 
12 reason for Otsuka to have told them about anything to 
13 do with the FDA observations of the manufacturing 
14 process . 
15 There are no sworn statements about 
16 anything that the guarantors said or wrote to Otsuka. 
17 They did state that they had a unilateral — they 
18 didn't use that word -- but they did state that they 
19 had an understanding and belief in their affidavit 
20 I about the February lease, but there is no 
21 understanding. Unilateral understandings and beliefs 
22 that are uncommunicated are not admissible as evidence 
23 to show fraud. 
24 There is no sworn statement that Otsuka 
25 orally said anything to the guarantors. They know 
c
.OCKY MOUNT? Ill RSTCRTI-KC SERVICE, ZliC . 



























statement that there ware damages from the 
substitution of the Season's machine for the Otsuka 
machine. And this is critical, your Honor. Fraud 
requires damages. Damages are their sole province. 
We can't help them with damages. They have got to 
come forward and show they were damaged by the 
substitution of the machine. 
For exampiQ, -here's no statement that the 
patients refused to use the Seamon's machine and 
demanded that they only be examined by an Otsuka 
machine. There's no sworn statement that the doctors 
would not refer to the Wasatch center because they 
wanted their patients to be examined under an Otsuka 
machine instead of a Seamon's machine. Thgre is no 
sworn statement that the costs to run the center were 
higher with the Seamon's machine rather than the 
Otsuka machine, or that the center would have been 
profitable with an Otsuka machine, but boy, with that 
Seamen's machine, this center just failed. There's no 
sworn statement whatsoever and there's no showing of 
any damages whatsoever. 
Now, they do make one meager attenpt to 
show damages. They 3ay that the guarantors incurred 
financial obligations. The affidavit doesn't lay a 
foundation for that. Doesn't say when; doesn't say 
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1 how much; doesn't say whether there was a 
2 corresponding benefit. But, your Honor, the mere 
3 incurrence of a financial obligation is not the 
4 showing of damages. When I incurred a financial 
5 obligation to buy my house, I was benefitted. I was 
6 not damaged. When the guarantors incurred a financial 
7 obligation with respect to the MRI center, they got a 
8 benefit, an investment in an MRI center. They weren't 
9 damaged. 
10 Just by way of example, by another 
11 analogy, if you wanted to buy a Pontiac by ski season 
12 and you went out and you built a garage for your 
13 Pontiac, and Pontiac told you geez, I just can't get 
14 it there by ski season because it just won't be 
15 perfect, will you take the Euick? And you agree and 
16 you take a Euick, and you go put that Buick in your 
17 garage, have you been damaged by building the garage? 
18 I dcn't think so. 
IS THE COURT: Mr. Doctorman, you've gone 
20 somewhat over your time. How close are you? 
21 MR. DOCTORMAN: I'm about two minutes 
22 I away, your Honor. 
23 ' THE COURT: All right, go ahead. 
24 I MR- DOCTORMAN: A failure to deliver goods 
25 I in the future might be a breach of contract, but it 
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cannot be fraud if there's nc proof of intent not to 
deliver. That's the Causaiman versus Northwest case. 
3 I What Otsuka did in offering to substitute financing 
4 J for the Seamen's machine for the Otsuka machine was 
5 | not fraudulent, it was stellar corporate behavior. 
I 




Windows '95, they didn't offer to finance Appl* 
products. When Boeing i« late with an airplane, they 
don't offer to finance McDonnell-Douglas. Being late 
















it's not fraud. But not paying for what you get is 
wrong. The guarantors have failed tc shew even any 
elements of fraud. 
In summary, your Honor, I want to make 
j clear I'm not suggesting that there's questions of 
fact remaining to be decided on plaintiff's motion. 
I'm not fighting their facts. It's just that their 
facts do not shew fraud. The law requires that the 
guarantors defend summary judgment with sworn 
statements that would be admissible at trial setting 
for all the elements of fraud with particularity. 
Even if everything that the defendants say in sworn 
statements was true, they have not shown fraud with 
particularity. They have not shown that $275,000 is 
not sufficient consideration for the guarantees. 
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1 We would request that the Court grant 
2 I plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and deny the 
3 cross motion for summary judgment, and also point out 
4 to the Court that the uncertain defenses that are 
5 mentioned in our brief, a whole list cf them that have 
5 not been briefed whatsoever, or affidavits, should be 
7 also dismissed. And we would like to reserve the 
9 ' issue of attorneys' fees for a future hearing, your 
9 Honor. Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. 
11 Dectorman. 
12 Mr. Orton, you intend to argue this; do 
13 ycu not? 
14 MR. ORTON: Yes, I do. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I've allowed him 
16 seme leeway in the time, so I'll grant you the same | 
17 opportunity. j 
IB MR. ORTON: Appreciate that. As I look at ! 
19 my watch, it looks like about 22 minutes, if that's J 
20 fair. 
21 Your Honor, before I begin, if I might, I 
22 j have some matters to hand out to the Court as well. 
23 In connection with our reply memorandum for the 
24 support, cf defendant'! cross motion for summary 
25 judgment, we've indicated by footnote that we would 
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1 provide the Court with certain pages of depositions I 
2 that were taken in the meantime. And I hava those 
3 here for the Court as well as a copy and the original 
4 I cf an opposition memorandum which wa filed, which we 
have here to file, an opposition to motion to strike 
6 I the affidavits of oar clients, which may pertain to 
7 I these motions. If 1 may just hand those up. 
8 I Appreciate it. 
I 
9 Your Honor, Mr. Doctorman apparently 
10 I believes that in order for my clients, the defendants, 
11 to prevail on either the motion to --
12 THE COURT: Just a moment. Can we help 
13 you, sir? 
14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry, I was 
15 told I was supposed to bring this for your clerk. 
15 THE COURT: Well, come ahead and bring it 
17 up. 
18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I apologise, your 
19 Honor. Thank you. 
20 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
21 MR. ORTON: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 As I was saying, I believe Mr. Doctorman 
23 apparently is of the misperception that in order for 
24 my clients to prevail against his clients' motion for 
25 I summary judgment and against our cross motion for 
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1 I summary judgment, we must somehow prove each and every 
2 element of a fraud claim. In fact, there were nearly 
3 ten minutes of dissertation this morning related to 
4 that argument. 
5 I want to point out to the Court before we 
6 begin we're not here to discuss that as part of the 
7 summary judgment on the issue of fraud, because we 
8 I have not moved on the issue of fraud. What we have 
9 moved on, your Honor, is we have moved on our cross 
10 I motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff cannot 
11 I prevail because there are no questions of fact with 
12 regards to consideration; that consideration as a 
13 I matter of law must be proven and shown by the 
14 1 plaintiff, which it has not done for the reasons I'll 
15 state in a few moments. As far as that, as a matter 
16 of law, our motion or cross motion for summary 
17 judgment must be granted. 
18 J As to Otsuka's motion for summary 
19 judgment, however, there's a slightly different 
20 approach this Court can and should take. Defendant 
21 can prevail if it shows this Court there's a question 
22 of fact with regards to consideration and/or shows the 
23 Court that there is a question of fact with regard to 
24 fraud, not that we have proven everything prima facie 
25 or that we have proven it by a preponderance of the 
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1 evidence or by applicable standard, but that there was 
2 a question of fact. 
3 With regard to their motion for summary 
4 judgment, the issue, the sole issue, frankly, is the 
5 issue of consideration. The issue of consideration. 
6 Mr. Doctorman has laid out in great detail this chart 
7 showing various places where it talks about renewals 
3 of obligations, defects in obligations and so forth 
9 and so on, all of which presuppose that there was ever 
10 an underlying obligaticn that had validity. 
11 But what Mr. Doctorman failed to point out 
12 to the Court is that the original lease, your Honor, 
13 the February, 1993 lease, which he says is modified by 
14 the August 5th letter agreement, is modified by the 
15 August 5th lease agreement. That particular lease, 
16 which is the granddaddy, the earthspring, the genesis 
17 of his claim, his client's claim here, was void, 
18 evanishio, not for a failure of consideration, as he 
19 indicated at the beginning of his comments, but rather 
20 for a total lack of consideration. 
21 Lack of consideration, your Honor, is a 
22 matter which the Supreme Court of Utah has addressed 
23 on numerous occasions. Lack of consideration of the 
24 failure to prove prima facie elements of a party's 
25 claim is set forth in General Insurance Company of 
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1 J America versus Carnessario Times Corporation, a 
2 memorandum, a case which we pointed out to the Ccurt 
3 in our brief, which indicated very clearly your Honor, 
4 that in a contract claim, which this guaranteed claim 
5 I is, that the plaintiff bears the burden cf proving 
6 each and every element of his claim. It's not for us 
7 to disprove elements. It's up to him to prove that 
8 I there is an element of the claim. 
9 Now, what do we have in this case by way 
10 of proof that there is any consideration given for my 
11 clients' signatures on the guarantee in February of 
12 1993? My client signed a lease agreement in February 
13 of 1993 with regards to an Otsuka MRI machine, with 
14 regards to various improvements that were going to be 
15 made to the site, which my clients had looked forward 
16 to producing near the Alta View Hospital in an effort 
17 to create some economic benefit for everyone, 
18 Everyone was aware of that. They signed that 
19 agreement. They signed the guarantees that related to 
20 that agreement. But guess what? Mr. Doctorman's 
21 client failed, I think intentionally so, failed to 
22 sign the underlying lease agreement. 
23 Now, Mr. Doctorman very quickly says you 
24 need to overlook, your Honor, the fact that there was 
25 this underlying document. He tries to somehow 
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1 I disassociate the guarantees from the so-called 
2 underlying lease agreement. Let me point out to you, 
3 your Honor, that the only consideration that could 
4 have been given for the guarantees in February of 1993 
i 
5 I was not the so-called underlying lease agreement, 
6 which should have been signed by his client, but was, 
7 I in fact, that agreement which should have been signed 
8 in consideration for the lease, for the guaranteed 
9 agreements themselves. In fact, Mr. Doctorman has 
10 taken the position that the guarantees related to the 
11 February lease, contrary to what he mentioned this 
12 morning. On page 4 of his reply memorandum in support 
13 of his motion for summary judgement, he says: "Otsuka 
14 does not dispute that the guarantees unquestionably 
15 apply to the February lease," ergo, that they were 
16 I consideration for the February lease and vice versa. 
17 That's his position. 
18 He then goes on to take this position. 
19 "And by the guarantee's explicit terms to any 
20 renewal, modification or extension of the February 
21 lease.'1 He says he wants it both ways. He wants to 
22 say the guarantee's unquestionably related to the 
23 February lease; the February lease was consideration 
24 for the guarantees. Bui: that, because of that 
25 signature, they were then modified, and that their 
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1 claims of subsequent modification can be allowed for 
2 that reason. 
3 Let me point out, your Honor, something 
4 very simple. Very simple. If the defendants, ray 
5 clients, your Honor, owed no obligation to Otsuka as 
6 of August 5, 1993 because Mr. Doctorman's client 
7 failed to sign the lease agreement, or if the 
8 guarantees were void for failure of consideration for 
9 the same reason, then the October 5th letter 
10 agreement, the October 5th lease, these document he's 
11 passed out to you today, did nothing more, your Honor, 
12 than reaffirm the fact that the obligation -- that no 
13 obligation existed. 
14- Read with me, if you would, on the second 
15 page of the August 5 letter agreement. Bottom of the 
16 page. Highlighted there. "The undersigned pledgers, 
17 subordinating parties and collateral assignors, with 
18 respect to the master lease and all schedules entered 
19 pursuant thereto, and the undersigned guarantors with 
20 respect to the master lease and Schedule 2 thereto, 
21 acknowledge and consent to foregoing and reaffirm 
22 their respective undertakings to Otsuka and its 
2 3 ass ignors." 
24 At the time, your Honor, my clients were 
25 under the mistaken impression that they were obligated 
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1 j to the February lease. They weren't obligated to the 
2 February lease, your Honor, because Mr. Doctorman's 
3 client had taken the position as set forth in the 
4 deposition testimony of Mr. Salzberg that number one, 
5 j it hadn't been signed, that Otsuka never would sign 
! 
6 it, that Otsuka never considered itself to be bound by 
7 that agreement. Never considered itself to be bound 
8 by that agreement. 
9 You haven't heard any of that this morning 
10 from Mr. Doctorman, and I think it belies the 
11 intention here, because they had no obligation when 
12 they signed this document. Renewing something that 
13 didn't exist simply meant they had no other 
14 obligation. Zero times zero is zero. Actually, it's 
15 | infinity. It has nothing, it has no meaning. Didn't 
16 have any obligation at that time. 
17 I Your Honor, I also heard this morning from 
18 I Mr. Doctorman a plethora of things that he believes we 
19 should have stated with regard to fraud. Again I 
20 point out, your Honor, that fraud is not something we 
21 have to prove to have this Court deny their motion for 
22 summary judgment. If we can convince the Court that 
23 fraud existed, sure, that would be a basis for denial, 
24 I agree with that. But that isn't absolutely required 
25 for us to prevail, nor, your Honor, is it absolutely 
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1 required that we prove that today in order for the 
2 I Court to grant us leave to file an amended answer and 
3 counterclaim if we make the appropriate 
4 representation, affirmative claim of fraud, which the 
5 Court is also aware is pending. That isn't required. 
6 But I think it's important for the Court 
7 to understand some of these fraud elements and 
8 understand now, today, that this isn't the simple type 
9 of punching case that Mr. Doctorman is so willing to 
10 have us believe. Mr. Doctorman's client is a 
11 subsidiary of a multi-group conglomerate of a Japanese 
12 company who decided at some point in time to make an 
13 entry into the MRI business here in the United States. 
14 They decided quite calculatedly how to do this, I 
15 would submit. 
i 
16 I To attempt to gain the business of the 
17 University of Utah, they knew full well that my 
18 clients had access to an association with those 
19 people, had some relationships with those people, and 
20 therefore curried our favor in an attempt to secure 
21 that business. In fact, they admit that in their 
22 j response affidavit and memorandums. 
23 They knew full well, your Honor, that we 
24 were looking to open up our business at earliest by 
25 the 1993 ski season. MRIs are a big business with 
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1 skiing, with skiers, with people hurting their knees, 
2 breaking their legs, hurting their knees and ankles. 
3 That's big business, and they knew that. And they 
4 knew that when we began talking to them in the fall of 
5 1994, that they needed to do something to get our 
6 favor. And what they did is they represented they had 
7 a state-of-the-art MRI machine, which was the 
8 supermachine of the next few years; that it would do 
S wonders for our business; that we would do marvelously 
10 j in competition with our competitors. 
11 And so in November of 1992, they entered 
12 into a quotation where they agreed to provide a 
13 certain type of MRI machine, in return for which we 
14 would agree to do certain things. There's a critical 
15 statement that was made at that time, and I'm quoting 
16 from a memorandum from the quotation itself. The 
17 parties agree by a document that was, in fact, signed 
18 by both parties: "Funding shall be provided by 
19 execution of mutually-acceptable documentation and 
20 upon purchaser's acceptance of the installed OE1.5 
21 system." They knew that that's a condition that 
22 proceeded any obligation on any part to go forth, that 
23 they would have to have a mutually-accepted signed 
24 agreement, signed by both parties. Between November 
25 of 1992 and February of 1993, they negotiated that 
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1 I particular agreement. In fact, that document was 
2 signed, at least by my clients, in February of 1993. j 
3 However, what they failed to tell you, 
4 what they failed to tell my client, is that in the 
5 latter part of January, 1993, that the FDA, which 
6 monitors all such types of medical devices, came in 
7 and began an audit of their business- They did not 
8 tell us that fact. They did not tell us that as of 
9 I the first of February, 1993, that the FDA had told 
10 them they have to cease scanning, MRI scanning on all 
11 human beings. Don't you think that would be pertinent 
12 and relevant to my client? Of course it would be. 
13 Did they tell my client that at that time, 
14 j before they signed? No, they didn't. Thereafter the 
15 FDA, and there's some dispute on this, I will attest, 
i 
16 j as to whether the FDA required them to or whether they 
17 had a pang of conscience and decided to tell their own 
18 customers about the fact, they told two of their 
19 customers who had had this machine delivered to them 
20 that they should srop testing with them in the future. 
21 That's what they admitted in the record, undisputed 
22 record. 
23 The point of the matter is, your Honor, 
24 they failed to tell us even that; failed to tell us 
25 even that. And so my clients went ahead and signed 
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it. They failed to tell us that in March or April 
that they made a unilateral decision not to ship any 
more machines until they determined that it had met 
their own internal -- their own internal --
guidelines. 
All these things happened, your Honor, 
omissions, omissions. We don't have to prove all 
these misrepresentations. But let's talk about 
misrepresentations for a minute. 
We were told and led to believe that in 
February when we signed the agreement, they would sign 
the agreement- It never happened. We were told by 
Ms. Patty Cox, one of their employees, later on when 
she delivered some materials to us, gave us the 
distinct impression, misinformed us, that these 
documents had been, in fact, previously signed. In 
fact, in August when we signed the new documents, your 
Honor, they prepared documentation which clearly is 
designed to mislead us and did mislead us by basically 
saying here we're resigning a new agreement, modifying 
the old agreement, modifying the old obligation, all 
of which implies that they had some type of an 
obligation signed to and agreed to by the parties in 
the past. 
Now, for counsel to come in here and say 
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1 I that we don't have a case of fraud I think is 
2 undercut, really, by the facts. What we have here, 
3 your Honor, however, is clear-cut defenses in the 
4 motion for summary judgment, which his clients have 
5 not achieved, and frankly clear-cut reasons why this 
6 Court should subsequently grant our motion. 
7 And perhaps more importantly, your Honor, 
8 on the-basis of consideration, they do not and have 
9 • not shown, nor can they show that they provided 
10 consideration, consideration for my clients' 
11 signatures on the guarantees in February, 1993. And 
12 because of that, they cannot prove, let alone allege, 
13 their prima facie case for collection. The motion for 
14 summary judgement by Otsuka must be denied. 
15 The motion for summary judgment, cross 
16 motion for summary judgment, I believe should be 
17 granted. At a minimum the Court should grant our 
18 motion for leave to amend, to allow us to search these 
19 defenses, to have full and complete discovery in these 
20 matters and to assert and go to trial on our issues. 
21 THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. 
22 Orton. Counsel, I will take the motions for summary 
23 judgment under advisement. I will notify you promptly 
24 by minute entry decision. Thank you. 
25 MR. DOCTORMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
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1 j MR. ORTON: Thank you, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Let's return to number 2 on 
3 the calendar. 
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